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Moore v. State, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 4 (January 19, 2006)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – FRAUDULENT USE OF A CREDIT CARD 
 
Summary 
 
 Appellant Moore was convicted of fraudulent use of a credit card based on an 
incident that took place in a Las Vegas Wal-Mart.  His suspicious behavior2 while 
shopping attracted the attention of a loss prevention specialist.  The loss prevention 
specialist suspected Moore might attempt to purchase goods with a credit card, and 
instructed a cashier to contact management if Moore presented a credit card without 
proper identification.  Moore brought over $300 worth of goods to the cashier’s register 
and presented a credit card.  When Moore could not produce identification, the cashier 
summoned a manager who took the credit card to the loss prevention specialist for 
examination. 
 
 The loss prevention specialist discovered that the credit card was reported stolen 
and detained Moore.  Moore claimed to have the cardholder’s consent to use the credit 
card, which was not verified.  Moore was subsequently arrested and charged with one 
count of fraudulent use of a credit card, one count of possession of a credit card without 
the cardholder’s consent, and one count of burglary.  A jury found him guilty on all 
counts, and the court adjudicated him as a small habitual criminal. 
 
 Moore appealed his conviction on all counts.  The Nevada Supreme Court upheld 
the convictions for burglary and possession of a credit card without the cardholder’s 
consent and the adjudication as a small habitual criminal on those counts, but reversed 
the conviction for fraudulent use of a credit card.  The court determined that a stolen 
credit card must be processed and charged to constitute fraudulent use.  Since Moore’s 
attempt to obtain goods with a stolen credit card failed, he did not actually “use” the 
stolen card and could not be convicted. 
 
Issue and Disposition 
 
Issue 
 
 Whether presenting a stolen credit card for the purchase of goods is sufficient 
“use” to establish fraudulent use of a credit card when no goods are obtained. 
 
Disposition 
 
                                                 
1 By Stephanie Hamrick. 
2 According to a loss prevention specialist, Moore was “selecting merchandise in the men’s and electronics’ 
departments ‘without rhyme or reason.’”  Moore v. State, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 4 at 2 (January 19, 2006). 
 Mere presentment of a credit card to purchase goods does not constitute “use” of a 
stolen credit card.  The credit card must be processed and the account charged in order to 
support a conviction for fraudulent use of a credit card. 
 
Commentary 
 
State of the Law Before Moore 
 
 This is an issue of first impression in Nevada, requiring the court to determine 
what constitutes fraudulent use of a stolen credit card.  Nevada law states that a person 
who, with the intent to defraud, “[u]ses a credit card or debit card to obtain money, 
goods, property, services or anything of value where the credit card or debit card was 
obtained or retained in violation of NRS 205.690 to 205.750, inclusive” is guilty of a 
category D felony.3   
 
Appellant Moore and the state disagreed regarding the meaning of the word “use” 
in the statute.  Moore argued that a stolen credit card must actually be processed and 
charged to constitute “use.”  However, the state argued that fraudulent “use” includes 
presenting a credit card in order to obtain goods, regardless of whether the goods are 
actually obtained.  The jury convicted Moore based on instructions stating that “[a] 
person who, with the intent to defraud, uses a credit card where the person possesses the 
credit card without the consent of the cardholder is guilty of Fraudulent Use of a Credit 
Card.”4 
 
 The court recognized the ambiguous interpretation of the word “use” in the 
statute, and the legislative history did not reveal the meaning that the legislature intended.  
Consequently, the Nevada Supreme Court examined other jurisdictions’ interpretation of 
similar statutes to determine the proper interpretation of the Nevada statute. 
 
Other Jurisdictions 
 
 The Supreme Court of Arkansas considered a similar situation in Davidson v. 
State.5  There, the defendant attempted to use a stolen credit card on two occasions, but 
neither transaction was completed.6  The Arkansas fraudulent use statute employs similar 
language as Nevada, and states that “[t]he offense of fraudulent use of a credit card is 
committed if a person, with the purpose to defraud, ‘uses a credit card to obtain property 
or services with knowledge that: (a) the card is stolen.’”7  The court stressed that the 
degree of the crime depends on the value of goods obtained,8 therefore, if no goods were 
                                                 
3 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.760(1)(a) (2005). 
4 Moore, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 4 at 4. 
5 810 S.W.2d 327 (Ark. 1991). 
6 Id. at 328. 
7 Id. (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-207 (Michie 1987)). 
8 If the value of the goods obtained exceeds $100, the defendant is guilty of a Class C felony.  If the value 
of the goods obtained is less, the defendant is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.  Id. (citing ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-37-207(b) (Michie 1987)). 
obtained, there could be no crime under the statute.9  The Supreme Court of Arkansas 
used this analysis and the rule of lenity to determine that fraudulent use of a credit card 
requires that the defendant actually obtain goods with the credit card.10 
 
 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island considered a similar situation, but reached 
the opposite conclusion after interpreting a slightly different fraudulent use statute.  In 
State v. Gonsalves,11 the defendant presented an altered credit card to purchase goods but 
then paid cash instead.12  Rhode Island’s statute13 declares that “a person who, with the 
intent to defraud, uses a credit card for the purpose of obtaining goods or who obtains 
goods by representing that he is the cardholder is guilty of fraudulent use of a credit 
card.”14  The court reasoned that the legislature’s use of the disjunctive “or” implied that 
the legislature intended to prevent unlawful use of a credit card, including unsuccessful 
attempts to use a credit card.15  Even though Rhode Island, like Arkansas, penalized 
defendants differently based on the value of goods obtained, the court interpreted the 
statute broadly and declared that “the statutory language should be expanded to include 
goods obtained or sought to be obtained.”16 
 
Nevada’s Interpretation 
 
 The Supreme Court of Nevada decided to adopt the reasoning set forth by 
Arkansas in Davidson, and declared that fraudulent use of a credit card requires the credit 
card to be processed and charged.  The court reasoned that this interpretation conforms 
with “a stricter reading of our criminal statutes required by the rule of lenity.”17   
 
 In addition to Davidson, the court also relied on a prior version of the fraudulent 
use statute to support its finding.  The current fraudulent use statute states that one who 
“[u]ses a credit card . . . to obtain . . . goods”18 is guilty of fraudulent use.  However, prior 
to a 1985 amendment, the statute read that one who “[u]ses a credit card for the purpose 
of obtaining” goods is guilty of the same.19  The elimination of the language “for the 
purpose of” obtaining goods indicates that the fraudulent use statute is meant to protect 
merchants and credit card companies from suffering monetary loss.  Consequently, the 
statute cannot apply to mere attempts to use a stolen credit card where no loss occurs. 
 
 Nevada does not penalize offenders differently like Arkansas and Rhode Island, 
but Nevada does impose mandatory restitution.20  If no goods are obtained, the court 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 Id.  
11 476 A.2d 108 (R.I. 1984). 
12 Id. at 109. 
13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49-4 (1956). 
14 Moore, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 4 at 7 (citing Gonsalves, 476 A.2d at 110). 
15 Gonsalves, 476 A.2d at 111. 
16 Id. 
17 Moore, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 4 at 8. 
18 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.760(1)(a) (2005). 
19 Moore, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 4 at 8-9 n.29. 
20 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.760(1) (2005) (“In addition to any other penalty, the court shall order the person 
to pay restitution.”) 
cannot order restitution.  This supports the conclusion that goods must actually be 
obtained in order to commit the crime of fraudulent use of a credit card; otherwise, part 
of the punishment would be a nullity. 
 
Effect of Moore on Current Law 
 
 Nevada has effectively limited prosecutions under NRS 205.760 to instances 
where credit cards are actually processed and charged.  Consequently, failed attempts to 
use stolen credit cards will relieve criminal defendants of prosecution under this statute.  
Defendants who do not obtain goods with a stolen credit card may be subject to other 
charges which are also punishable as category D felonies.21 
 
 However, the court articulates its finding in two separate ways, resulting in an 
unclear determination of what activities are actually necessary to constitute fraudulent 
use.  In one instance, the court states that “[i]n Nevada, for fraudulent use of a credit card 
to occur, the credit card must be processed and the account charged.”22  However, in its 
conclusion, the court states that “Moore’s action of presenting a stolen credit card to 
obtain goods, when the credit card was neither processed nor the goods obtained, does 
not constitute fraudulent use of a credit card.”23  Although it is conceivable that where a 
stolen credit card is processed and charged, the defendant will usually obtain the goods, 
this may not always be the case.  What if an alert cashier discovers that a credit card is 
stolen immediately after processing the credit card but before handing over the goods?  
While this may be an unlikely scenario, there may be room to argue that the statute is not 
violated in such a circumstance.  
 
 Further, the court did not address the effect of NRS 205.800(1), which states that 
“[a] person who receives money, property, goods, services or anything of value obtained 
in violation of NRS 205.760, knowing or believing that the money, property, goods, 
services or other things of value were so obtained, is guilty of a category D felony.”24  
The court’s interpretation of the fraudulent use statute renders the two statutes virtually 
identical and punishable as independent category D felonies.    
 
Conclusion 
 
The criminal charge of fraudulent use of a credit card is only appropriate where 
the defendant’s use of a stolen credit card results in the credit card being processed and 
the account charged.  Nevada’s adherence to the rule of lenity prohibits a broader reading 
of the fraudulent use statute.  A stricter reading serves to protect merchants from 
suffering actual losses at the hands of fraudulent purchasers.  Therefore, Moore’s 
unsuccessful attempt to obtain goods by merely presenting a stolen credit card did not 
                                                 
21 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.690 (2005) (possession of a credit card without consent); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
205.710 (2005) (sale or purchase of a credit card); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.720 (2005) (Obtaining control of 
credit card or debit card as security for debt); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.740 (2005) (forgery of a credit card); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.750 (2005) (unauthorized signing of a credit card). 
22 Moore, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 4 at 9 (emphasis added). 
23 Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
24 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.800(1) (2005) (emphasis added). 
suffice for conviction under the statute, and the verdict on that count was reversed.  
However, the court upheld convictions on the remaining counts of burglary and 
possession of a credit card without the owner’s consent.   
 
